We focus on the construction of the digital signature scheme for local broadcast, which allows the devices with limited resources to securely transmit broadcast message. A multi-group authentication scheme that enables a node to authenticate its membership in multi verifiers by the sum of the secret keys has been proposed for limited resources. This paper presents a transformation which converts a multi-group authentication into a multi-group signature scheme. We show that the multi-group signature scheme converted by our transformation is existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA secure) in the random oracle model if the multi-group authentication scheme is secure against impersonation under passive attacks (IMP-PA secure). In the multi-group signature scheme, a sender can sign a message by the secret keys which multiple certification authorities issue and the signature can validate the authenticity and integrity of the message to multiple verifiers. As a specific configuration example, we show the example in which the multi-group signature scheme by converting an error correcting code-based multi-group authentication scheme. key words: internet of things, local broadcast, digital signature, fiatshamir transform, low energy
Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) represents all things connect to the Internet and share information with each other. Such information allows devices to mutually control and operate. The source and destination devices should mutually authenticate each other. In each independent application and services, devices should be authenticated by independent secret information. In asymmetric key-based authentication, those to be authenticated, i.e. a prover, has a pair of a public/secret key and those to authenticate, i.e. a verifier, has the public key. The prover demonstrates to the verifier that it is indeed in possession of the secret key of corresponding to the public key via messaging protocol. Application systems which behave as the verifier generally have their own public key infrastructure (PKI). That is to say the prover uses a different secret key certified by its authority for each application to perform authentication.
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services. A malicious user may be able to successfully masquerade as a valid prover due to the leak of a single secret key since the verifier identifies the prover by a single secret key for each application. For such a security issue, the multi-group authentication scheme proposed by Halford [1] , which proves by the sum of the secret keys. It suppresses the increase in the amount of transmission data compared to the naïve approach. In addition, it is impossible to masquerade for a malicious user unless all the secret keys are revealed because the verifier authenticates by the sum of a plurality of secret keys. Some physical devices are controlled by the information stored and exchanged in the network, thus any accidental or malicious alteration of the information may cause serious trouble. Therefore, a sender should attach a digital signature to the transmission data in order to safely use the IoT technology. The digital signature which validates the authenticity and integrity of the data is signed by different key pairs for each application or service like authentication. In that case, the sender is required to make an individual signature for the same data to different destination. We focus a multi-group signature which a message is signed by multiple keys the independent PKIs issue like the multi-group authentication.
In this paper, according as Fiat-Shamir paradigm [2] , we describe how to construct multi-group signature schemes from multi-group authentication schemes and give a security proof. We show the concrete multi-group signature scheme where digital signature is generated by multiple secret keys so as to verify multiple verifiers simultaneously.
Authentication Scheme

Classification of Schemes
We classify the authentication scheme into three approaches, knowledge-based authentication (e.g., ID/password) [3] - [6] , key-based authentication (e.g., public/secret key) [7] - [9] , and the authentication based on an interactive protocol system which involves a prover and verifier. Zero-knowledge proof based protocols seem to be suitable for WSN to reduce the energy consumption [10] . As one of the authentication based on zero-knowledge proof, Stern has proposed code-based authentication [11] . More efficient schemes based on the Stern's scheme have proposed [12] - [15] .
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The simplest authentication schemes verify the validity of the sender in the two party model such that a verifier authenticate a prover. Since the use cases have expanded and the application has diversified, the authentication scheme for multiple provers or verifiers have proposed. As the example of some provers, authentication server verifies identity of multiple requests of users at the same time to decrease the load of the system in [16] and the authentication schemes which can determine whether all provers participated in a group communication belong to the same group has proposed [17] , [18] . As the example of some verifiers, a multigroup authentication scheme which authenticates provers by the sum of the secret keys has proposed [1] .
Entities
There are two entities in the authentication scheme; prover and verifier. We focus the authentication scheme through a three-pass interaction between the prover and the verifier. prover: A prover, holding a secret key, sends a message called a commitment to the verifier and provides a response following a challenge. verifier: A verifier receives commitments and returns a challenge consisting of a random string of some length. After the verifier receives a response from the prover, the verifier calculates the estimated response value by a public key, the commitment and the challenge. If the estimated value corresponds to the response obtained from the prover, the verifier authenticates the prover.
Authentication Scheme Using a Single Key
Algorithms
The authentication scheme ID = (K, Co, Ch, R, V A ) consists of the five algorithms where K is the key generation algorithm, taking as input a security parameter 1 k and returning a public key and secret key pair ( pk, sk); Co is the commitment algorithm, taking as input sk and returning a commitment Cmt; Ch is the challenge algorithm, taking as input the length c of the verifier's challenge and returning a c bits challenge; R is the response algorithm, taking as input (sk, Ch) and returning a response Rsp; V A is the verification algorithm which verifiers verify provers, taking as input ( pk, Cmt, Ch, Rsp) and comparing Rsp and a response value obtained from ( pk, Cmt, Ch). That is, V A returns 1 as decision Dec if and only if both coincide.
Security Definition
Secure schemes prevent a malicious adversary impersonating the prover without the knowledge of the valid secret key. The definition that an authentication scheme is secure against impersonation under passive attacks (IMP-PA secure) [19] 
We say that an ID is secure against impersonation under passive attacks if the Adv ima−pa ID,I (k) is negligible for every impersonator I of probabilistic polynomial in the security parameter k.
Multi-Group Authentication
When different authentication services use a different public key pair, namely provers possess multiple public key pairs, the authentication scheme of Sect. 2.3 must perform the authentication protocol as much as the number of key pairs in order to simultaneously receive multiple authentication services. The multi-group authentication scheme [1] which enables a prover to simultaneously authenticate its membership is proposed. In that scheme, a prover demonstrates to multiple verifiers that it is indeed in possession of the multiple secret keys to be authenticated by multiple verifiers.
Algorithm
The multi-group authentication scheme mg − ID = (mgK, mgCo, Ch, mgR, mgV A ) consists of the five algorithms where mgK is the key generation algorithm, taking as input a security parameter 1 k and the number M of keys required and returning M public key and secret key pairs
; mgCo is the commitment algorithm, taking as input N secret keys
and returning a commitment Cmt; Ch is the same in Sect. 2.3.1; mgR is the response algorithm, taking as input ({sk 
are same keys in input of mgCo, and returning a response Rsp; mgV A is the verification algorithm which verifiers verify provers, taking as input 
Security Definition
We define IMP-PA secure of the multi-group authentication scheme. In Definition 1, an impersonator I tries to impersonate the prover who has a single secret key. However, an impersonator I tries to impersonate the prover who has N secret keys in following Definition 2. Therefore, we assume that I can get outputs of a transcript generation oracle where a prover has N secret keys. Definition 2 [IMP-PA security of multi-group authentication schemes] Let mg − ID = (mgK, mgCo, Ch, mgR, mgV A ) be a multi-group authentication scheme, and let I be an impersonator, be st its state, and be k the security parameter.
Define the advantage of I as Adv 
Then, we associate to a mg − ID and N key pairs {( pk i , sk i )} N i=1 a randomized transcript generation oracle which takes no inputs and return a random transcript of an "honest" execution, namely:
We say that a mg − ID is secure against impersonation under passive attacks if the Adv ima−pa mg−ID,I,N (k) is negligible for every impersonator I of probabilistic polynomial in the security parameter k.
Signature Scheme
Entities
There are two entities in signature schemes; signer and verifier. signer: A signer generates a signature to sign a message by using a secret key. verifier: A verifier verifies the validity of signature for a message by using a public key.
Signature Scheme Using a Single Key
Algorithms
The signature scheme DS = (K, S, V s ) consists of the three algorithm where K is the key generation algorithms, taking as input a security parameter 1 k and returning a public key and secret key pair ( pk, sk); S is the signing algorithm, taking as input sk and a message m and returning a signature σ; V s is the verification algorithm, taking as input ( pk, m, σ) and checking whether σ is a valid signature for m. That is, V S returns 1 as decision Dec if and only if it is valid. The signing algorithm may be randomized, drawing coins from a space Coins S (k), but the verification algorithm is deterministic.
Security Definition
Security of a signature scheme is defined as kinds of attacks and difficulty in forgery. We describe that a signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosenmessage attacks (EUF-CMA secure) [20] in the random oracle model [21] In the signature scheme of Sect 3.2, a signer makes signature by using a single key. In contrast, in the multi-group signature scheme, the signer makes signature by using multiple keys. The multi-group signature scheme mg − DS = (mgK, mgS, mgV s ) consists of the three algorithms where mgK is the key generation algorithm, taking as input a security parameter 1 k and the number M of keys required and returning M public key and secret key pairs {(
; mgS is the signing algorithm, taking as input N secret keys
The definition that a multi-group signature scheme is EUF-CMA secure in the random oracle model is shown here. In Definition 3, a forger F forges a signature made by using a single secret key. However, the forger against multi-group signature schemes will forge a signature made by using multiple secret keys. Thus, F can get the usual signing oracle plus direct access to the random oracle for multiple secret keys. Definition 4 [EUF-CMA security of a multi-group signature scheme] Let mg − DS = (mgK, mgS, mgV s ) be a multi-group signature scheme, let F be a forger and k the security parameter. Define the advantage of F as 
Transforming Into a Multi-Group Signature Scheme
The Fiat-Shamir (FS) transformation is a general method to construct signature schemes from authentication schemes. The security of signature constructed by FS transformation, namely FS-type signature, is discussed in several literature.
Pointcheval et al. [22] showed that an FS-type signature is EUF-CMA secure in random oracle model if the underlying authentication scheme is honest-verifier zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. Abdalla et al. [23] relaxed the below condition. More precisely, they proved the equivalence between the EUF-CMA security of an FS-type signature and the IMP-PA security of the underlying authentication scheme in the random oracle model. This result indicates that the IMP-PA security of the underlying authentication schemes is essential for proving the security of FS-type signatures in the random oracle model. In this paper, we show the below result is satisfied even multi-group.
The Fiat-Shamir Transformation
A signer computes a commitment Cmt just as a prover would at signing a message m. In authentication schemes, a prover receives a challenge from a verifier. A signer hashes Cmt m using a public hash function h to obtain a challenge Ch = h(Cmt m), then computes a response Rsp just as a prover would, and sets the signature of m to Cmt Rsp. Let ID = (K, Co, Ch, R, V A ) and s: N → N be an authentication scheme and a function which we call the seed length, respectively. The Fiat-Shamir transformation associates ID with a signature scheme DS = (K, S h , V h s ). The signing and verifying algorithms are defined as follow:
DS has the same key generation algorithm as ID, and the output length of a hash function equals the challenge length of ID.
Transformation from a Multi-Group Authentication Scheme to a Multi-Group Signature Scheme
This section presents the transformation from a multi-group authentication scheme to a multi-group signature scheme satisfied the definition in Sect. 3.3.
Let mg − ID = (mgK, mgCo, Ch, mgR, mgV A ) be a multi-group authentication scheme and let s: N → N be a function which we call the seed length. We associate to these a multi-group signature scheme mg − DS = (mgK, mgS h , mgV h s ). It has the same key generation algorithm as the multi-group authentication scheme, and the output length of the hash function equals the challenge length of the authentication scheme. The signing and verifying algorithms are defined as follow:
Note that the signing algorithm is randomized, using a random type whose length is s(k) plus the length of the random tape of the prover. Furthermore, the chosen random seed is include as part of the signature, to make verification possible. Thus, we construct the multi-group signature scheme mg − DS = (mgK, mgS h , mgV h s ) from the multigroup authentication scheme.
Security Proof
We use the concept of min-entropy [24] , which is also quoted in [23] , to measure how likely it is for a commitment generated by the prover of an authentication to collide with a specific value. Definition 5 [Min-Entropy of Commitments] Let mg − ID = (mgK, mgCo, Ch, mgR, mgV A ) be a multigroup authentication scheme. Let k ∈ N, and {(
be key pairs generated by mgK on input k.
; R P ) : R p ∈ Coins P (k)} be the set of commitments associated to N secret keys {sk i } N , where N ≤ M. We define the maximum probability that a commitment takes on a particular value via
Then, the min-entropy function associated to mg − ID is defined as follows:
where minimum is over all {( pk i , sk i )} N i=1 generated by mgK on input k.
It is proven that the Theorem 1 for security of the multigroup signature scheme as follows:
Theorem 1
Let mg − ID = (mgK, mgCo, Ch, mgR, mgV A ) be a multi-group authentication scheme, let s(·) be a seed length, and let mg − DS = (mgK, mgS h , mgV h s ) be the multi-group signature scheme as per Sect. 4.1. Let β(·) be the minentropy function associated to a mg − ID. Let F be an adversary attacking a mg − DS in the random oracle model, having time-complexity t(·), making q s (·) sign-oracle queries and q h (·) hash-oracle queries. Then there exists an impersonator I attacking a mg − ID such that
Furthermore, I has time-complexity t(·) and makes at most q s (·) queries to its transcript oracle. We will prove Theorem 1 by referring to [23] and using code-based game-playing [25] which is quoted in [23] . We let G A i ⇒ y donate the game G i outputs with an adversary A takes value y. In the code-based game-playing, we use the Fundamental Lemma [25] in order to determine the upper limit of the random variable. We can apply the Fundamental Lemma only when the game G i and G i+1 meets an equivalence relation on games called identical until bad. We say that G i and G i+1 are identical until bad if their code is the same until one is substituted for the flag bad. Lemma 1 Let G i , G j be identical until bad games, and A be an adversary. Then,
Lemma 2 Let G i , G j be identical until bad games, and A be an adversary. We let Good i , Good j be the events that bad is never set in games G i , G j , respectively. Then,
In a multi-group signature scheme which prover has multiple secret keys, we consider two models of attackers. When multiple secret keys are required for generating of the signature, one attacker does not have any secret keys, called model 1, and another has a subset of the secret keys, called model 2. Proof in the model 1 We first transform a forger F into an adversary A with the following properties. A has time-complexity t(·) + O(q s ), makes at most 1+q h (·) hash queries, makes at most q s (·) sign queries, has advantage no less than that of F, and additionally has the following properties: We define an impersonator I against an ID. It has input pk Then, it runs A on input pk. We assume that A makes q h (k) hash-oracle queries and I will embed a challenge value in any return values of hash queries. When A makes a hash query x, the impersonator I returns HT [x] 
If Eq. (2) is true, then Eq. (1) is true. We will use games G 0 to G 5 of Figs. 1 and 2 to derive Eq. (2) by rewriting the games. For 0 ≤ i ≤ 5, let Good i denote the event that game G i never sets bad. We state a chain of inequalities which we will justify below:
Game G 0 simulates the execution environment of I. The interaction with the verifier is not explicit. Instead, the verifier's challenge Ch * is chosen in line 002 of Initialize. I can obtain the transcript from its oracle, so line 004-007 generate their value. However, G 0 generates them explicitly by using the secret keys chosen at line 000. 
The Finalize procedure of G 3 has the same output as that of G 2 . However, lines 133-135 are absent in G 3 . The other change it makes is to delay the choices of lines 101-105 until they are needed in replaying sign queries. These replies are the same as in G 2 . The setting of bad does not affect the game output, so we have 
where Eq. (8) is obtained from Eq. (7) and Lemma 1 since games G 3 , G 4 are identical until bad games. When the value x of line 323 had been provided, G 4 sets bad. Therefore, the probability that the i-th sign query sets bad in G 4 is at most
Given that the boxed code of line 325 is not present in G 4 , the code to reply to sign queries is equivalent to that in G 5 barring to longer setting bad. The latter does not affect the game output, so 
Concrete Construction
This section presents a concrete construction of multi-group signature scheme which is EUF-CMA secure based on a code-based multi-group authentication scheme [1] which follows definition in Sect. 2.4 and is IMP-PA secure.
Algorithms
The concrete scheme is composed of three algorithms, KeyGen, Sign, and Verify. KeyGen(1 n , M): It takes as input the security parameter n. It selects a random binary n-tuple s i ∈ F n
